> The more I look at the govtrack.us page for this bill, the more names I recognize, the more I think "we really need to get away from politics being a legit `career` option."
Which has been tried, and the extreme on the other end isn't pretty either. Strict term limits in California (prior to some revision in 2012) meant that Senators and Congresspeople were almost never around long enough to truly get involved and understand an issue. There was a lot of freshman lawmakers all trying to make their own mark, perpetually blind to the prior efforts.
The question really is how many years in congress, the senate, or both is too much, and how low of term limits is too low? If we can't find a happy middle ground (I honestly don't know), then maybe we need to step back and examine the question again, and decide whether there are some other levers and incentives and regulations we can use to our benefit.
Note: It's also worth looking at whether passing institutional attitude (knowledge?) as you described is actually a bad thing, or a natural correlation. If that district or state has a particular leaning, it could be that it's just natural that a similarly positioned person will be more likely to pick up the seat later.
The only long-term solution is to reduce the power and scope of the government. The Siren Song of power lures the worst types. If the federal government had vastly reduced power, then it would not attract these types of people, and making a career of it would be no more glamorous that sitting on city council for 20 years in a small town.
Term limits are a stop-gap measure. And let's say they go into effect. Well, the day after the term is up, the politician will step through the revolving door into the lobbying world, advising the new crop of term-limited representatives on how to "get things done."
I won't lie, that connection did come to mind as I wrote that. Especially since the submission regarding Javascript Fatigue[1] the other day which covered it quite a bit.
I think this might be mostly because Senators and Congresspeople are basically like the old aristocrats, each dragging behind them a train of assistants and policy analysts that are working directly for them, serving as the technocratic backstop to their policy decisions. A short-term congressman necessarily will have inexperienced employees (at least, inexperienced in the considerations of that particular district), and thus—even with the very good normative beliefs (the things that are "their stance")—they will have flawed positive beliefs (their knowledge of facts and research that can inform "their stance.")
If you could truly split congress from its technocratic base, such that each new member of the House or Senate is just "plugged in" to a long-lived technocratic base-infrastructure (in the same way the President is!) then we could achieve much shorter term-limits while still achieving high effectiveness.
We could achieve shorter term limits, but if the problem is persisting political opinions that may not represent the people, then it may make the problem worse. :/
Term limits are a band-aid, even at the Presidential level as far as I'm concerned. If someone is a shitty rep, then stop electing him, and likewise if he's a great rep then all term limits do is give you more chances to elect a shitty rep.
Which has been tried, and the extreme on the other end isn't pretty either. Strict term limits in California (prior to some revision in 2012) meant that Senators and Congresspeople were almost never around long enough to truly get involved and understand an issue. There was a lot of freshman lawmakers all trying to make their own mark, perpetually blind to the prior efforts.
The question really is how many years in congress, the senate, or both is too much, and how low of term limits is too low? If we can't find a happy middle ground (I honestly don't know), then maybe we need to step back and examine the question again, and decide whether there are some other levers and incentives and regulations we can use to our benefit.
Note: It's also worth looking at whether passing institutional attitude (knowledge?) as you described is actually a bad thing, or a natural correlation. If that district or state has a particular leaning, it could be that it's just natural that a similarly positioned person will be more likely to pick up the seat later.