> The government absolutely should not be trusted.
You're contradicting yourself.
> So are you.
No I'm not. The keys will be acquired when necessary, if they haven't already.
> If they had the signing key they wouldn't need to ask Apple for anything.
That would be true if the goal was to gather forensic data from a single phone. As I stated above, it's foolish to look at this situation in isolation. The FBI's (and other government agencies) history of trying to restrict encryption and gain access to communication technologies says the government has other goals.
You might have noticed that there has been a propaganda campaign going for a while now that has been framing encryption as a "terrorist tool" that is causing law enforcement's investigations to "go dark". The goal isn't the phone; this is about framing Apple (and Silicon Valley in general) as impediments to public safety.
No, you appear to be purposely taking my words out of context.
I said the government should not be trusted with a carte blanch skeleton key to access any phone.
Then you said I'm trusting the government not to get access to Apple's signing keys. Which of course I trust, and which you do too. If the government could get Apple's keys, they could just make their own firmware change, sign it, and install it on any phone they want. They wouldn't need this case.
> No I'm not. The keys will be acquired when necessary, if they haven't already.
Now that is some tin foil hattery. That would be reason for outcry. It's a big leap from where we are now.
If this case sets a precedent in either direction (pro or anti privacy), then the battle is already lost because nobody understands what's going on. This is in no way the same as the government circumventing privacy. If people don't understand that, then they're not going to understand a more principled argument of a company impeding a perfectly legal request to get access to the data on a phone.
Is your problem that you don't like the ability of the government to get and execute a search warrant against a person? You don't think they should be able to? If they can search your property, and they can demand for example that your landlord grant physical access, then I see no problem with this request. The responsibility is Apple's to make it so the phone can't be unlocked by Apple.
> No, you appear to be purposely taking my words out of context.
Purposely? You didn't provide much context. Apparently you include some large exceptions whee you do trust the government.
> you do too.
I've already told you I don't, because the government has a pattern of behavior that suggests otherwise. What is the basis for your trust that they wouldn't go after Apple's signing key? (or any other key)
Did you forget that the government forced Lavabit to turn over their private key?
> they could make their own firmware change
I've already addressed that, but I'll add that they could still take that route in the future.
> Now that is some tin foil hattery
Insults like that do not help your argument.
> It's a big leap from where we are now.
Perhaps. I don't think it's a very big leap at all to suggest that the government might repeat tactics they've used in the past.
> Is your problem that you don't like the ability of the government to get and execute a search warrant against a person?
Of course not, that's stupid. I have no problem with most warrants. I do have a problem with the general warrants being used by the FISA court, which were the reason we have the 4th Amendment.
> they can demand for example that your landlord grant physical access,
That's correct. However, this case isn't about Apple simply granting access to some of the property they own.
> make it so the phone can't be unlocked by Apple.
In the future, that would be a good solution (zero-knowledge techniques are always a good idea.
You're trusting the government to not acquire the signing key from Apple.