I'm not sure I'd describe it as "resolved". They've deployed a couple of countermeasures that take advantage of bugs in this particular implementation of the exploit (it doesn't detect parity errors in the card-to-reader transmissions and replies yes to the PIN authentication command even if it's sent at the wrong time). Those bugs can easily be fixed, and the first trick is probably very familiar to most folks acquainted with Funcards.
In CDA, the responses are encrypted by the card, which means a they can no longer be spoofed.
The only lingering possibility of this type of attack occurring is in regions where offline transactions are still permitted, and if you can find a terminal which still does not have CDA capabilities or if you have a card which doesn't have CDA. Totally possible, but the opportunities are diminishing rapidly as the issued has been RESOLVED.
The CDA cards have this advantage over the DDA cards, in that the message signed by the ICC which includes an additional Application Cryptogram (AC), which is used to protect and validate the specific transaction messages (amount, time, etc) generated during the transaction. The ICC uses the AC Session Keys (derived from the ICC AC Master Key, shared only between the ICC and the card issuer) to place this MAC on the transaction details.
