In his article Mr. Wall says: "So it's rather ironic that my views on Postmodernism were primarily informed by studying linguistics and translation as taught by missionaries, specifically, the Wycliffe Bible Translators. One of the things they hammered home is that there's really no such thing as a primitive human language. By which they mean essentially that all human languages are Turing complete. When you go out to so-called primitive tribes and analyze their languages, you find that structurally they're just about as complex as any other human language. Basically, you can say pretty much anything in any human language, if you work at it long enough. Human languages are Turing complete, as it were."
The former Wycliffe Bible Translator/Summer Institute of Linguistics member Dan Everett reportedly counters this in the New Yorker article. "Everett, once a devotee of Chomskyan linguistics, insists not only that Pirahã is a severe counterexample to the theory of universal grammar but also that it is not an isolated case." This article is fascinating.
My grad school experience is too far in my past to exactly distinguish the nuances between "non-Turing-complete" and "not conforming to Chomsky's universal grammar" -- so have at it discussing the differences. In any case, this article describes a language where it's impossible to describe some common human ideas -- and not through lack of vocabulary, and perhaps not even because of inadequate grammar. Rather, the language betrays a completely different mindset where such ideas may not be relevant to survival.
Dan Everett, former Wycliffe missionary, reached crisis when he found no way to describe the notion of a God or Jesus Christ and their relation to humans to this Amazonian tribe. Mr. Everett decided that if there are people to whom one cannot convey a Christian message, the message must not be universal and cannot be real.
I'm wondering whether the premise of the language as not Turing complete holds up though. The article claims that the Piraha language lacks abstractions, including counting. Perhaps that could count as incompleteness, but I'm not so sure, and the article doesn't say enough to clear it up. Even if a person cannot use recursive linguistic forms, such as "I saw the dog by the river", they can say, "I saw the dog. The dog is by the river". Can they also say, "Another dog came to the river"? Is that enough context, without tracking the precise count?
Another thought, just because they don't care about a historical fact, is the fact that the story can be told in the language enough for completeness? Even without precise numeric counts?
Does Turing completeness even make sense as a description for a natural language?
I'm using "Turing complete", perhaps incorrectly, in the sense that Larry Wall (inventor of Perl) did in a related article at http://www.perl.com/lpt/a/997, where he says: "Basically, you can say pretty much anything in any human language, if you work at it long enough. Human languages are Turing complete, as it were."
Pirahã seems to be a language where expressing certain kinds of complex ideas doesn't work. Sure, one might say "I saw the dog. The dog is by the river." I'm not sure that's the same as "I saw the dog which bit me while I was down at the river yesterday looking for fresh-water oysters to feed my mother-in-law to impress her because she's telling my wife I'm a loser because my alligator hunting sucks." My impression is it's hard to express the latter thought in the language, even breaking it up into separate sentences, without using recursion, which the language lacks, at some point.
It is not in fact impossible to express that sort of sentence in Piraha. Embedding is accomplished by "noun-ifying" a clause by adding "-sai". The debate is whether or not this suffix represents actual embedding/recusion. This debate has been discussed at length in Language and other sources.
I'm not sure if this applies, but... can't you convert any recursive algorithm into a looping one? In which case iterating over the loop will let you say anything. But this seems to take the metaphor too far :-)
One of the most remarkable parts of the language is that is does not have recursion. Nor does it have ways of explicitly differentiating temporally distant events.
This is an old article, but there are new ones a-comin'; the implications of Dan's work are just starting to be realized.
Even Everett Says: If you go back to the Pirahã language, and you look at the stories that they tell, you do find recursion. You find that ideas are built inside of other ideas, and one part of the story is subordinate to another part of the story. That's not part of the grammar per se, that's part of the way that they tell their stories. (http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/everett07/everett07_index.ht...)
As the Harvard people argue, Everett kind-of redefined Piraha Grammar. So there isn't recursion in Everett's official grammar even through the Piraha use recursion in their communication by everyone admission.
"If you go back to the Pirahã language, and you look at the stories that they tell, you do find recursion. You find that ideas are built inside of other ideas, and one part of the story is subordinate to another part of the story. That's not part of the grammar per se, that's part of the way that they tell their stories. So my idea is that recursion is absolutely essential to the human brain, and it's a part of the fact that humans have larger brains than other species. In fact, one of the papers at the recursion conference was on recursion in other species, and it talked about how when deer look for food in the forest, they often use recursive strategies to map their way across the forest and back, and take little side paths that can be analyzed as recursive paths. So it's not clear, first of all that recursion is unique to humans, and it's certainly not clear that recursion is part of language as opposed to part of the brain's general processing.
He says Piraha doesn't have recursion and that he thinks recursion isn't essential to human languages (thus in contradiction with Chomsky theories), but that it's part of how the brain processes information.
I took note of the whole passage. Everett defines the Piraha grammar as not having recursion. He claims that when the Piraha use recursion in their linguistic communication ("story telling") they are somehow doing it outside the Piraha language. But the Piraha language is defined by the usage of the Piraha, not by one or another codified grammars.
Nevins et al. (linked above) note that recursion takes multiple forms in multiple languages and there isn't even anything terribly unusual about the form it takes in Piraha, even if this is a form Everett cannot accept into the grammar.
I was talking to a friend and they said that in order to quantify objects this tribe counts on a logarithmic scale and not an ordinal one, which I found quite cool, since there's really no reason why we must count in one or the other (logarithmic or ordinal).
This seems counterintuitive at first, but logarithms are just ratios and henceforth sometimes actually more useful than ordinal counts - for example, when comparing say, land mass sizes and one plot is 1sq mi larger than the other. Without the context of the size of the plots, this is relatively useless (if they are huge, they're about exactly the same, if one is small then the other is massively bigger). If we say plot B is 1 log unit larger than plot A then it is twice (if base 2) bigger than plot A, no extra context required.
It is surprising, but the human brain is wired to think logarithmically, it is only by years of training that our brains get re-wired to do otherwise. Stanislas Dehaene has done a lot of research in this area (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislas_Dehaene). The study of how the brain interprets continuous and discrete signals (for example sound and numbers) has led to the discovery that the neural representation
of number is comparable to the slide rule calculators, which was also graduated with a logarithmic
scale. See (http://www.unicog.org/publications/Dehaene_WeberFechnerNiede...)
It is very efficient to do calculations logarithmically and evolution appears to have optimized our brains (and that of a few other animals) in this respect.
It is surprising, but the human brain is wired to think logarithmically
Then again, we perceive forces, brightness, and loudness logarithmically. (This is not just the subjective experience. The way we are wired to our sound, light, and kinesthetic receptors is indeed logarithmic.) Why shouldn't we also naturally think that way?
There is an episode (entitled "Numbers") of WNYC's Radiolab (available for free as a podcast at http://www.wnyc.org/shows/radiolab/) that talks about the possibility of an innate ability in infants to interpret quantities on a logarithmic scale, which is later supplanted by the ability to count ordinally. I haven't looked into how much evidence there is to support this theory, but the anecdote offered in the podcast is thought-provoking.
I actually came here to post the same link but you beat me to it! I also remember seeing some of the research related to humans estimated comparisons between two things, and that we naturally use a logarithmic scale to do this...but I couldn't remember the details of the paper.
Maybe this tribe has small mutation in FOXP2 gene causing impairment in comprehension of typical human grammar.
EDIT:
Maybe not.
> Gordon ruled out mass retardation. Though the Pirahã do not allow marriage outside their tribe, they have long kept their gene pool refreshed by permitting women to sleep with outsiders.
Unless this mutation is dominant.
> A Pirahã child removed from the jungle at birth and brought up in any city in the world, he said, would have no trouble learning the local tongue.
It's important to note that the case of the Pirahã doesn't salvage the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Whereas Whorf posited that the absence of a word for a given concept in a language means the people who speak that language cannot think about the concept, the evidence of the Pirahã seems to suggest the reverse: that the reason they don't have words for certain concepts is that they don't think about them.
Nonsense. Extending a language to denote new concepts is easy. You can borrow a word from another language (ennui, schadenfreude); you can repurpose an existing word (broadcast, which once meant to stand in your field and throw seeds in every direction); and you can coin a new word (Twas brilling, and the slivy toves / Did gyre and gimble in the wabe).
The Pirahã don't have words for concepts that fall outside their cultural worldview for the simple reason that they have no need of such words.
Regardless of the completeness of the language, I was really stunned by the total lack - as characterized in the article - of natural human curiosity. Does anyone know whether this component of the story is accurate?
Pretty much every component of this story is being filtered through the claims of one man, a man who's one of only two known outsiders who speak their language to any extent - and according to the other person, not very well. Think how very weird you could make any group of people seem to another if you were the only person who could translate between them.
These people have no art, but they make impromptu sculptures with moving parts and decorative necklaces. They have no use for change and reject all things of the outside world, except for clothing, cloth, thread, machetes, movies, and random strangers, including families who hang around for decades trying to learn their language. They don't point...except maybe with their chins. Their language is strange and unusual - unless it's in a way that casts doubts on Daniel Everett's understanding, like Keren Everett's claims about prosody.
We don't know what these people are saying to Everett, and we have no idea what he's saying to them, due to either deception or a language barrier. Skepticism strikes me as entirely appropriate.
My spouse, being a scientist, watched one of his presentations and was astounded by the lack of real examples that would support Everett's world changing (in Linguistics) thesis. If he has made so much effort to try to convince others, why hasn't yet simply recorded enough data to support it?
At University, my degree thesis was about an editor. You type in simple text phrases and it tries to parse, and if it can parse, displays the results in the bottom half of the editor window. This way you can write a database in plain English (eg, 'The cat is green') while making sure it's parseable too. You know it's parseable because the bottom window makes sense (it shows Prolog predicates - is_green[cat] )
It's just a UI concept, but something I've never managed to get finished.
In this interview, Everett mentions that he met a 13 year old girl in Brazil who happened in fact to be a Pirahãn—working as a cashier clerk, fully well able to count and do maths.
The children can learn to count. The issue is reaching the age when your brain stops forming new connections without having language for certain concepts. If you lack the language to describe something you can't understand it. The only way an adult understands new concepts is in terms of previously known ones.
Does it not violate ycombinator etiquette to just vote someone down past 0 without explaining why? My comment wasn't remotely snarky, nor something I wouldn't say to anyone's face.
I don't think it does violate etiquette - although it's usually pretty obvious that the comment being downvoted is not a good contribution, either in the insulting or rude category, or in the unhelpful "lol, ++, good read, {joke from TV show}" style.
I can only guess, but I wonder if yours was downvoted for making claims that seem wrong without backing them up - I don't think there is an age when new connections are no longer made nor do I agree that adults can only learn from what they already know - but I wouldn't vote it down because of my disagreement.
Though there has been recent discussion on people voting down purely for disagreement, and that might well violate etiquette. But just <0 without a comment doesn't necessarily do so.
Well my mistake, I didn't realize this point was still under contention. I was under the impression that it's common knowledge that new connections are not created in the brain after a certain age (15-ish as I recall) and all new connections must be formed from existing ones.
This is why e.g. bilingual kids learn new languages much faster than people who only speak one language, people who learn an instrument as a child can pick up new ones much faster, etc.
What is a personal theory of mine is that if you don't have language to understand a concept by a certain point you can never truly understand it. The only places I point to that support my theory are the few cases of children being raised away from humans [1] and this Pirahã story. It's pretty difficult to prove scientifically since it would require destroying someone's life.
But on this site, of all sites, I would expect discussion about it, not a simple down vote.
[1] I've heard of at least 2 seperate cases where through some odd circumstanced a child reached teenage years without learning any kind of communication with humans. After they were rescued, in both cases they were never able to grasp concepts much further than a young child (around where chimps who learn sign language get to). This is by no means conclusive, since they obviously went through an incredibly traumatic experience, but as I mentioned above, there is no easy way to apply scientific method to this theory.
Everett's claims are extremely controversial. Also, this article is over two years old; hardly news. There have been several articles in the last few issues of Language have discussed the "exceptionality" of Piraha.
There's nothing wrong with posting older articles here, though it's customary for the submitter or an editor to add a (2007) to indicate it is not new..
Stephen Pinker's The Language Instinct is a good popularization.
Caveats: Pinker diverges from Chomsky on a lot of things, but he makes it fairly plain what's his and what is Chomsky. Pinker also gets a bad rap (unfairly in my opinion) of being a retrograde right-winger, because of his association with evolutionary psychology.
In his article Mr. Wall says: "So it's rather ironic that my views on Postmodernism were primarily informed by studying linguistics and translation as taught by missionaries, specifically, the Wycliffe Bible Translators. One of the things they hammered home is that there's really no such thing as a primitive human language. By which they mean essentially that all human languages are Turing complete. When you go out to so-called primitive tribes and analyze their languages, you find that structurally they're just about as complex as any other human language. Basically, you can say pretty much anything in any human language, if you work at it long enough. Human languages are Turing complete, as it were."
The former Wycliffe Bible Translator/Summer Institute of Linguistics member Dan Everett reportedly counters this in the New Yorker article. "Everett, once a devotee of Chomskyan linguistics, insists not only that Pirahã is a severe counterexample to the theory of universal grammar but also that it is not an isolated case." This article is fascinating.
My grad school experience is too far in my past to exactly distinguish the nuances between "non-Turing-complete" and "not conforming to Chomsky's universal grammar" -- so have at it discussing the differences. In any case, this article describes a language where it's impossible to describe some common human ideas -- and not through lack of vocabulary, and perhaps not even because of inadequate grammar. Rather, the language betrays a completely different mindset where such ideas may not be relevant to survival.
Dan Everett, former Wycliffe missionary, reached crisis when he found no way to describe the notion of a God or Jesus Christ and their relation to humans to this Amazonian tribe. Mr. Everett decided that if there are people to whom one cannot convey a Christian message, the message must not be universal and cannot be real.