"I wish that, just once, some terrorist would try something that you can only foil by upgrading the passengers to first glass and giving them free drinks."
That's pretty much the best summary of the issue I've ever read.
Schneier says that security worked in this case, because passengers subdued the bomber. But as others point out, that only worked because the bomber screwed up. And it was only an issue because the bomber was allowed on the plane, with a bomb; let's not forget that.
Now the TSA may be considering restricting people to their seats in the last hour, with nothing on their lap. (Does that mean no blankies too?)
I eagerly await the first no-tolerance arrest, when a passenger leaves his seat against regulations in the last hour to subdue a bomber.
The smart thing to do, if you want to set up an effective TSA-like organization, is go to Israel, the UK, and other places which have a history of significant terrorism and which have developed effective or mostly-effective responses. Study what they do, learn what they've learned (since often they've learned it the hard way), then come back and use it as a basis for your own general counter-terrorism plan.
The way the TSA is actually doing things, however, is simply to ask "what did the last terrorist do? OK, ban that." Which doesn't stop the last guy, since he already did it, and won't stop the next guy, since he's going to do something else.
> The way the TSA is actually doing things, however, is simply to ask "what did the last terrorist do? OK, ban that."
Though what he did was walk onto a plane with a block of semtex. They should try addressing that before restricting in-flight entertainment and toilet breaks.
I actually caught a flight back from Schiphol to Heathrow last week. Heathrow's security on the flight there was annoyingly thorough as usual (shoes off, belts off, laptops out, liquids in a clear bag with 100ml limit... none of which would have helped this case!). The Dutch security was different: hand luggage through the scanner, no special treatment for laptops, liquids or shoes - much more agreeable. Then they put you through a "security scan", one of these new millimetre wave scanners that are supposed to detect items strapped to the body - like drugs and guns. I've been wondering did Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab have the PETN strapped in his underpants, and the fancy new security scan failed to pick it up? Or was it in his bag, where the X-ray didn't see it?
This is pure arse-covering. The problem in this case is that Homeland Security received a tip-off from the terrorist's father telling them he was planning to blow up their plane, which they decided to ignore. Their solution is to treat the traveling public like a kindergarten class, no standing, no getting something from your bag, etc. What's next, banning people from talking to each other incase they're collaborating?
It is true that terrorists rarely attack planes in Israel. There they blow up coffee shops and restaurants and buses. A successful TSA just means that the threat will be targeted somewhere else.
I've been to LHR and I'm going to partially disagree with this. The people that work at ATL, ORD, LAX, LGA, and IAD are morons compared to the people that work security at LHR, or FRA for that matter.
Wow. In my experience LHR security is among the worst (as in most annoying) I've experienced Europe. If they are far above the people at US airports I feel sorry for anyone having to fly in the US. For what it's worth I've found the Swiss and Dutch to be the best, followed by the Germans.
I wonder if we do that. We have officer exchange programs with UK, Pakistan, probably Israel and many others, for military cross-pollination. Seems crazy if we don't do that for TSA.
The "stay in your seat during the last hour" rule isn't completely frivolous. Bombers arriving in the US are likely to wait until they are over their destination city because it will make the bombing more dramatic. The goal is fear, not deaths. Also, people tend to procrastinate suicide bombings.
Obviously, stewardesses telling people to stay in their seats won't prevent bombers from detonating their bombs, but it may make their behavior more noticeable to other passengers.
I'm very surprised that there still isn't some screening machine that detects all explosives. How hard can it be? It'd be much nicer to just walk through a big sniffing machine than all the other ineffective rigmarole.
We were lucky this week. If the only thing that prevented the plane from blowing up is early detection by other passengers, flying has become extremely insecure: terrorists just have to detonate their bombs in the lavatories.
That's pretty much the best summary of the issue I've ever read.