That is an interesting issue (detect differing resource loading based on the document jump) that affects regular fragments as well, but the idea is that particularly sensitive pages would know not to have fragment targets in the page but couldn't prevent text fragments. The solution given (deterministic loading independent of jump target) seems like a good idea to work towards but meanwhile I agree it is a minor concern and pages should not avoid reasonable navigation due to this issue. Particularly since there are often other ways of getting the same information with the same type of network analysis.
> An attacker can use this vulnerability to obtain root on OpenBSD 7.4 and 7.5.
Ouch! And this all due to unsanitized user input. I really would have expected better from OpenBSD in 2023. I mean I would expect better from everyone but especially from OpenBSD.
Thank you for that feedback, I removed a couple important pieces from the repo readme that I think would answer your questions around usage. I'll add them into the main site.
One of the patches that the University of Minnesota was banned for from contributing to the Linux kernel. They were trying to introduce a use-after-free (Fig. 9 in their paper).
I just had to think about how ironic it would be if "Jia Tan" turned out to be a Post-Doc from the University of Minnesota continuing that research on hypocrite commits.
All meaning all the browsers listed in the linked table. These may be the major browsers, but not all of them.