Only slightly related but I read "masters of doom" recently and I can't recommend it highly enough. It is a very entertaining read even if you are not crazy over video games. It tells the story of the two Johns, and mention Commander Keen among other things. Great read
I think it again depends on what you mean by hacker. If a web developer is passionate about web development, learns everything he can about it, enjoys doing it, and approaches it like an aesthete, then according to the author he is a webdev hacker (or whatever you want to call it). There are many other definitions of "hacker" that wouldn't include the aforementioned web developer (I'm thinking of Eric Raymond's essay on the topic). In the end, there doesn't seem to be a broad agreement on the topic.
I find this quote from the article very relevant (and I agree with it):
Equally important, though, is the hacker's attitude. Computer programming must be a hobby, something done for fun, not out of a sense of duty or for the money. (It's okay to make money, but that can't be the reason for hacking.)
I think the problem is more (6) deliberate practice is hard to define. Some people believe that just sitting and doing problem sets is deliberate practice. Some people believe that hacking on a side project is deliberate practice of programming skills. I don't think that any of those two examples would qualify as deliberate practice.
How would you define deliberate practice, then? I would agree that deliberate practice may be hard to define across all skills, but it could be defined for a specific skill.
For example in programing, I would consider problem sets and side projects with functions and goals that are aligned but still outside of one's normal scope of work to be deliberate practice. Working on Project Euler problem sets could be considered deliberate practice. They are problems that can be done in most any programming language, are known to be great for learning a new one, but generally fall outside the usual work of handling data, transforming content, etc.
I would consider Project Euler to be akin to practicing scales on a musical instrument: playing scales is not necessarily music in a "having popular appeal" sense, but it does enable new skills and depth of knowledge of the instrument.
Taking the Project Euler example, consistently doing the exercises, if they go in difficulty for each done, is deliberate practise in (probably) algorithm design, but does nothing for architecture. But redoing the same exercises over and over, always improving the design of it in each iteration (examples: reduce number of lines, apply DDD or hexagonal, etc, though the solutions in Project Euler probably not the best for this kind of practise) improves architecture skills.
The idea of deliberate practise is to always be improving in the tasks you are doing, usually by taking more and more difficult tasks in progression, but also analysing the past actions to identify where to improve. For example, I always liked to play tennis (and have many years of competitive table tennis behind me). Before I started working with a coach, my practises were mostly playing the game, maybe having a few swings against a wall when I didn't have a partner. When I started working with a coach, we practises my service over and over and over again, changing targets in the field, the kind of spin, and analysing most of the services to see what went right and wrong with my service. I can only say my skills improved at more than 10x the speed than when I was just having matches with other people.
I know many people who do stuff for ages now, but they aren't someone you would ask for advice, because they're so bad at it.
I know two photographs, one is mediocre and does this stuff for over 6 years now (professionally for money) and one is superb and does it for 2 years (for fun).
Most people who get involved with a specific thing never get to the practice part. They just read a bunch of stuff, do a bit of it and think they know everything...
If so this should really have been made clearer in the press coverage because it is very different from the way I and probably other people understood it. I understand that soundclound would need a way to make money, and what you describe seems like a very reasonable way to proceed. However, a youtube-like or spotify-like ads system would likely be much harder to sell to users.
I guess they haven't made it clear because while this is how it works now, but they don't want to set any expectations of that not changing for the future.
That was exactly my thought when I read the comment. I would be very curious to know if I'm missing something here, but it seems obvious to me that if a publicly owned company can do something better and cheaper (cheaper not only just for these people but also for the taxpayer, I don't know if that's the case here) then how is that a bad thing?
I agree with your remarks. One reason, however, why I still enjoy reading articles on the site from time to time is that they almost always make me think. Their perspectives, however flawed, have the merit of being strongly coherent, and trying to find what's wrong with an article turns out to be a very good exercise in judgment.
I had a similar thought when I watched the video. Actually, I thought about the concept of 'Quality' as introduced in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Two moments in particular:
- the consistent lighting part: the guy is making this giant epic thing, so you'd think he would cut himself some slack on what really looks like a detail (I wouldn't have noticed it, especially not in this type of game). And yet, the guy absolutely obsesses over it because, you know, that's how it feels right.
- the 'aging' part, when he explains how he kept upgrading old sprites or levels as his skills improved so they "would match up to his standard".
And the best part is that the guy doesn't come off as being arrogant or anything. Just a dude, making the game he would like to play, and making sure it's as good as he dreams it to be. Inspiring.
Ok, so I do believe that CEO's are usually overpaid with regard to their performance. That being said, I am not convinced by the methodology used in the study, specifically the period used for measuring the performance: 3 years. It sounds like a lot of time, but actually, I would expect a truly great CEO to undertake projects with a 5 years or more horizon. There's this great interview of Bezos discussing the point of focusing on quarterly results vs long term. So an alternative explanation for the findings could be: the highest paid CEOs invest in 5-10 years projects, so their results after 3 years are below average.
Again, I repeat that even before reading the study, I intuitively agreed with their conclusion, but I'm not so sure about their argument to prove it
Normally I would agree with you, but the average tenure of a Fortune 500 CEO is less than 4 years. If you raise the bar for period of performance, you're filtering out the bozos who go away quickly.
The way I read it that if you're not a superstar, you're investing lots of time horse trading and kissing babies to get the big bucks. That time would probably be better spent doing work productive to the business.
Looking at the first 3 years seems almost doomed to failure. It seems to me that it's pretty likely that a new CEO is going to be taking a company in a direction at least slightly different.
That means cutting out some projects may have been just about to pay off, while at the same time embarking on new ventures that won't bear fruit for some time.
One might interpret these results to say, "the highest-paid CEOs are engaging in the most expensive change for their firms". It's only natural that significant change is both forgoing some income that would have been realized soon, and creating risks for what's in the short-to-medium term while they look to the horizon.
This is all to be expected, and doesn't necessarily say anything about the amount of value they create in the long term.
The study should also consider the company's performance before the CEO takes over. If a CEO is coming in to rescue a company that's in trouble, they might expect to be compensated for the additional risk they are taking on.
Stock prices are based on the market's view of the future. You don't evaluate a CEO like a middle manager. If he cuts some critical program for strategic reasoning, the market will either punish him or reward him based on the future outlook.
Stock markets also consider risk, so when a new CEO pushes for a new direction, that's penalized initially even if it's the correct long term approach because more is unknown.
If you believe that business should have long-term horizons and not simply be a machine for organising the maximum possible quarterly profit, stock markets in their current form are one of the least efficient ways to organise labor and capital.
That's not how I understand your link. The study suggests to me that analyst recommendations are unreliable predictors of short-term gain. And it certainly does not show that changes in a company's overall market capitalization are based on a herd mentality.
Note that it says that those rebalancing according to advisors achieved higher terminal wealth, but lower risk-adjusted return. Most importantly, they did do better in the end. But adjusted for risk, it's worse. This suggests to me that the analysts usually do pretty well, but when they flub it, it's a doozy.
A couple issues. Poor CEO's probably don't last 5 years. I'd suspect a strong correlation to performance and CEO's "horizon". In that those CEO's focused on next years or next quarters numbers are likely to thave poor (longterm) performance. Superstars such as Bezos or Musk are probably anomalies and not useful in studying CEO performance in general.
Bezos and Musk are also founders. The basic problem with CEOs is that they pose a huge agency issue: they are supposed to be appointed as agents of the owners who are themselves represented by the Board of Directors. However, no one has ever found a way to provide effective oversight to ensure that CEOs act in the interests of the owners rather than in their own interests.
Attempts to tie CEO interests to owner interests by tying compensation to the company's performance have thus far failed, mostly because a) the fraction of compensation isn't sufficient to overcome the CEOs self-serving motivation or b) the specific tying system can be gamed to the CEO's advantage.
Furthermore, there is an asymmetry in the degree of interest between the parties: CEOs have a very large interest in maximizing their own compensation, while shareholders see CEO compensation as one expense amongst many others, and as such are less interested in it.
These issues have been known for a long time, and again: no one has come up with a viable answer. Anything anyone who is posting here thinks of has almost certainly been thought of before, tried, and seen to fail.
"Attempts to tie CEO interests to owner interests by tying compensation to the company's performance have thus far failed, mostly because a) the fraction of compensation isn't sufficient to overcome the CEOs self-serving motivation or b) the specific tying system can be gamed to the CEO's advantage."
and/or c) extrinsic motivators aren't effective for non-mechanical work.
What Dan Pink describes is that for non-mechanical work, extrinsic motivation is ineffective in improving performance: how quickly or accurately or insightfully or imaginatively one accomplishes a particular task.
But the question with CEO pay is a bit different, and I don't think the studies Pink refers to say anything about it: what can you do to encourage CEOs to act in the best interests of the companies they manage?
This isn't a matter of, e.g., whether they notice opportunities to attack a previously unaddressed market -- which is the kind of thing for which Pink finds extrinsic motivation isn't good at improving. It's a matter of whether, having noticed such an opportunity, they further notice that taking it would be good for the company but bad for them personally because, e.g., it would have short-term costs that would drive down the value of the shares they were hoping to sell next year to buy a new house.
In which case, the findings Pink describes might actually be good news: the prospect of personal gain may be ineffective in making unscrupulous CEOs good at spotting opportunities to screw their company over to make a quick buck.
You'd be surprised how long poor CEOs can last. I worked for one large company where the market cap went to a 1/10th of what the company has spent on acquisitions alone during the CEO's reign and a continuous sequence of questionable business decisions that included laying off pretty much anyone who could have been instrumental in helping the company recover. I think there are many other examples.
A CEO can always blame the economy, blame the market, blame the weather, blame their predecessors or otherwise spin things in a favorable way. They can sell a story of tough times needed to make a turnaround. Sometimes there will be some secret scratching behind the back (I'm on your board, you're on my board). There's the cognitive dissonance on the board side of things, we've selected this guy therefore he must be good. etc.
As others have said, the incentives are set in a way that a CEO looks primarly after his own interests. It's safe to assume that CEOs that make a lot of money are even better at looking after their own interests. They are also very good at convincing others that they're not looking after their own interests.
Genuine question: The article goes on and on about how making the apps paid in developing countries would make more sense than using ads, etc, etc.. Ok, I see the point. But is it really that different from the developed countries? How much do they get per user in advertisement? How much would it cost me if I wanted to opt out of advertisement? I don't know if people in general prefer ads, but if I had to pay, say $5 a year for a an ad-free whatsapp, I'd gladly pay. Is it ridiculously low compare to what they make with ads?
