We already know a bit about Google's automated wiretap system for Gmail, because it was the system that the Chinese attacked in 2009/2010 in an attempt to access the accounts of Tibetan human right's campaigners.[1][2]
Bruce Schneier wrote a bit about this back in 2010[3]
I'm surprised no one has mentioned this before, since it's public confirmation of much of what the PRISM documents say, on the record.
Minor correction, it was not attacked to access accounts of human rights campaigners. It was leaked 2 months ago that Google lied about this and that the actual purpose was to see which of China's spies google were watching under NSL/FISA orders. So yes it was clearly Prism that they were accessing.
The breach appears to have been aimed at unearthing the
identities of Chinese intelligence operatives in the United
States who may have been under surveillance by American law
enforcement agencies.
Justin Schuh is a google chrome security employee and former military/agency contractor with a TS clearance, who hinted that it is basically a REST API on his twitter feed. That's getting pretty close to Arrington's theory.
He's a little drunk on the red, white and blue kool-aid, right now and lashing out, but he had some comments earlier.
(make your own interpretation, I don't know him or anything else, that was just my read)
The point about these companies being in the program, and twitter not, is a huge distinguisher. That is essentially proof that there is some automation/privileged access.
Why, because he asked questions? He's as pissed as you are about the Verizon stuff, but at the same time being smeared by shoddy journalism on the "Prism" stuff.
His questions are legit, and I have some of the same questions, but he's also doing the smearing. I don't see him being smeared.
My feeling is also that this guy leaked material that he didn't fully understand, but that it doesn't matter because he could be wrong about all of the fuzzy details and it would still be just as bad.
Some interesting context, Morgan Mayhem/@headhntr, who he is debating with, is also a Google Security employee.
Interesting given they are having this conversation in public and that their joint-employer (where they both hold a security-orientated role) is directly implicated in this story.
This analysis sounds very reasonable and realistic; it does fit the evidence we have so far. The key insight is "automated process" -- and I'm sure the companies involved were really happy with that solution.
This part is a little naive though: "The NSA can begin surveillance on someone(s) for a full week before they have to get the rubber stamp from the secret court"
Since everything is secret, it's difficult for anyone to examine or challenge what the NSA does. If they have a week before going to court it means they have eternity, because no one is going to make sure that provision is always observed.
> Since everything is secret, it's difficult for anyone to examine or challenge what the NSA does. If they have a week before going to court it means they have eternity, because no one is going to make sure that provision is always observed.
"Secret" doesn't mean "code is written by people who don't document it and are then killed after it's shipped". Secret means that they don't trust you with keeping them honest.
What would be the point? The vast majority of the data is public, and Twitter will give you firehose access (essentially a stream of all tweets) if you ask nicely.
And as soon as you are not in the U.S. or aren't the citizen, they don't need any order at all, not even the broad one, it's lawful for security agencies to get as much as they can and for Google to not even log which queries were made.
Google can even help agencies by automatically informing them if the "target" fits "free to access" criteria. And everybody is still not breaking the law.
Moreover, the amount of belief by agency that the data are "free to access" is enough to be only 51% to make it lawful.
Please write if you know more nuanced details about these limitations. Everybody should be informed about the laws, that's why they exist and why they are called laws.
This was pretty much where my mind was going. You don't need direct access or drop boxes if you can just automate the process. It also squares neatly with Snowden's "All I'd need is to know your email address"... it's a search tool.
I think the best approach to a FISA order is to say "sure, no problem. We will have this all printed, bound, and shipped to you surface mail within 24 hour, preferably from our outsourced printing office in the Yucatan (it's a lot of pages and we don't have the equipment in house to do that). And on the off chance you want it to be electronically readable, we will print it out in OCR-A fonts. Great doing business with you. Have a nice day."
...if you want to middle-finger the US government. But why would Google, Facebook, et al want to middle-finger the government - a government that could massively help or hinder their ability to conduct business, etc?
> "It can begin surveillance a week before making the request to the secret court, and the surveillance can continue during the appeals process if, in a rare case, the spy court rejects the surveillance application."
How can this be constitutional? Doesn't the 4th amendment say you need probable cause before spying/searching on someone? I've also read that the NSA is spying on some, and then gives the info to the FBI, "which now has probable cause". It seems to me they are doing nothing more and nothing less than fishing expeditions, which are illegal/unconstitutional. I really hope someone manages to bring the Patriot Act and FISA to the Supreme Court this time around.
Also, I seriously believe US needs a Constitutional Court to look at all passed bills by Congress, before they become laws. Congress doesn't seem to care about the Constitution anymore and just passes stuff to make all sorts of things "legal", and could be a decade or two before they even arrive at the Supreme Court, especially with the president trying to fight them at every turn, and with all sorts of gag orders and whatnot - rules they are making to prevent you from even suing them over it. This is becoming increasingly more common with the worst of the worst laws.
I know there are some arguments against Constitutional Courts, but they are working quite well in Europe, and if they have a secret FISA Court that rubber stamps all the spying anyway, how much more damage could a Constitutional Court (that would be public, obviously) do? And of course, the laws could still arrive at the Supreme Court later, and judges would still have to verify their constitutionality in trials, just like today.
At least Americans would have an extra check on their governments from passing all sorts of crazy laws, thinking they get away with it, and might even leave office by the time it arrives at the Supreme Court, and passing these laws days before Christmas. At least it would stop the majority of crazy laws being passed by Congress.
The system you have now is simply not good enough anymore. Not when Congress and the president are breaking their oath to the Constitution on a daily basis.
One of the biggest criticisms of democracy is that it would be too slow of a process, when, for example someone runs a plain into a business building and kills lots of people.
So the founders of America created something called setting the country into a "state of emergency" which grants certain rights and privileges not normally legal. They didn't think that the government would be so power hungry that they'd just leave this feature permanently on.
The founders of America did no such thing. You should go read the Constitution yourself to verify, but I only know of the state of insurrection/rebellion or domestic attack as being mentioned explicitly by the Framers, and that was only in the context of suspension of habeus corpus.
If you look at the link you posted you'll see that the verbiage about "national emergency" was designed and implemented by Congress as law, not as part of the Constitution itself.
> Doesn't the 4th amendment say you need probable cause before spying/searching on someone?
Nope.
That's a valid interpretation, but that's not what it says. To directly quote Wikipedia (yeah, I know; IANAL): "the Court ruled in Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925), that the term probable cause means "less than evidence that would justify condemnation," reiterating Carroll's assertion that it merely requires that the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of reasonable caution" in the belief that specific items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime".
Your problem, really, is that you disagree with the government on what a "man of reasonable caution" would do.
You only need probable cause for US citizens IIRC. Anyone else is fair game as far as the NSA is concerned.
The twist here is that the NSA gets to trawl through the data looking for interesting stuff (to them) on a pinky promise to a judge (in a court that has never said no) that they won't target US citizens. Given that the US government has stated that a 51% chance that the target is not a US citizen is sufficient to meet this requirement (!), it sounds to me as if the NSA gets to target whoever they like (because taking a huge pile of data and processing it with automated algorithms is not 'collecting' it according to the State doublespeak) and if they happen to wind up targeting some US citizens, well they can always claim in court (should it ever come to that, which it won't) that they thought there was a 51%+ chance that they were dealing with non-US individuals. How would you ever challenge that?
The other part of that is context. The NSA can't come into your house and read your mail for a week. On the other hand, people let google read all of their email to sell ads.
I think there's the idea of a spectrum of intrusion. Looking in windows of a car is a search, but that stuff is already in plain view. Is that unreasonable? We all know email is plain text and the sender does not control routing. It's more like a postcard than a letter to begin with.
That said, I'm a weeks worth of surveillance without a warrant is horrifying.
Yeah I think this is on the right lines. See also the detail from this other article: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5845258 that implies that the government does not see _holding_ data as a particular problem, it believes that _looking_ at data is what it needs a FISA order for. The metaphor of receiving a van full of boxes, and only needing permission to open the boxes, but not needing permission to store them. Thats bad news because of the lack of oversight once the boxes are in their possesion.
This is similar to Mar Ambinder's explanation in "Solving the PRISM myseter" [1] and Robert O'Harrow et al's quotes from intelligence sources in "U.S., company officials: Internet surveillance does not indiscriminately mine data" [2]. From the second article, discussing "direct access":
Intelligence community sources said that this description, although inaccurate from a technical perspective, matches the experience of analysts at the NSA. From their workstations anywhere in the world, government employees cleared for PRISM access may “task” the system and receive results from an Internet company without further interaction with the company’s staff.
According to a more precise description contained in a classified NSA inspector general’s report, also obtained by The Post, PRISM allows “collection managers [to send] content tasking instructions directly to equipment installed at company-controlled locations,” rather than directly to company servers. The companies cannot see the queries that are sent from the NSA to the systems installed on their premises, according to sources familiar with the PRISM process.
Crucial aspects about the mechanisms of data transfer remain publicly unknown. Several industry officials told The Post that the system pushes requested data from company servers to classified computers at FBI facilities at Quantico. The information is then shared with the NSA or other authorized intelligence agencies.
I posted this theory on my G+ feed the first day it was leaked, that PRISM amounted to an automated-NSL-request-and-response management system, like an issue tracker. Click a button to mail an NSL request electronically, notify employee when company approves, go pick up the data automatically.
PRISM is an NSA issue tracker with auto-import essentially.
But someone else pointed out to me something more interesting. All companies which provide voice telephony, even VoIP, have to comply with CALEA, which means they have to install equipment maintained by the FBI which allows intercepts of Voice calls via search warrant.
Once Google added Voice/Video chat, they might have had to comply with this, just like Skype. Ditto for Apple and Facetime.
The Washington Post said something about the NSA tasking the FBI in this pipeline. Therefore, PRISM may be abusing CALEA devices which companies are compelled to install, by leveraging them for intercepts of voice in ways that don't fit the law.
So, revised theory:
For email and non-voice data, PRISM sends an NSL to company, waits for approval, then hits a REST API to pick up the goods.
For voice, PRISM sends request to FBI, who then commands CALEA device for intercept. No company action required?
CALEA is not only for voice. Broadband providers are required to be CALEA compliant. Basically they have to be able to delivery data in a specific format to an LEA.
These devices are not (normally?) under LEA control. The service provider would receive a warrant/court order that says "send data for customer XYZ to this CALEA capture IP". Even if the LEA had direct control of the CALEA device it would need the assistance of the SP to know what data is coming from what customer.
Is it possible that the NSA is in cahoots with the CALEA device manufacturers? Once a CALEA device has been integrated with the SP's system, might it be the case that it can act as a trojan horse?
On the one hand, they could wall off the device, and have packets routed to it after reviewing the request. On the other hand, the device could be unfirewalled from the rest of the network.
PRISM sure sounds a lot like a fiber-optic beam splitter. Also known as a prism. Fits the facts, gives the data, doesn't touch the servers or back-door anything, because the data is being captured, in total, on the way in and out of the server farm.
I like this theory. Up until now I've been viewing the media reaction with skepticism because the interviews, denials and official statements seem to contradict each other. And much as I dislike conspiracy theories this particular theory seems too 'tidy' to be dismissed out-of-hand.
The fascinating thing, for me, is whether this catastrophic blow to our privacy will actually even register with most users of the services that are deemed to be 'tainted'.
And if they don't care, at least not enough to stop using those services, then we have accepted these intrusions as a necessary consequence of modern technology and modern life.
Interesting theory, and definitely the more boring version which lends it some credibility. My only question would be that the NSA would have to have some assurance that the data they're receiving is legitimate.
I've sorta been saying this for a while. Earlier on my G+, but also here.
>(which I suspect were simply the dates that the companies brought up infrastructure to be able to quickly and easily comply with FISA warrants. Which means "direct access" is true, but it also means that "we were forced to make it easy to give the government what they want as soon as they need it")
This telling of the tale fits with pretty much what everyone said. The form-fill denials are true and make sense. The governments repeated references to FISA make sense, and it gives them a way to justify their legality.
The rest of the article is great for those cough that keep saying "FISA warrants" as if the warrants part means anything.
I mean, the API for this automated "Takeout [NSA style]" would be super easy. I can imagine it. And all the quirks in the spec. "Check the FISA warrant ID (or don't, it's just a mocked interface that returns true, same result as the court records)", etc.
Bruce Schneier wrote a bit about this back in 2010[3]
I'm surprised no one has mentioned this before, since it's public confirmation of much of what the PRISM documents say, on the record.
[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chines...
[2] http://www.techcentral.ie/21618/aurora-hackers-may-have-acce...
[3] http://edition.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/01/23/schneier.google.ha...